DISCUSSION PAPER

Agonistic Ethics
and the
Burden of Office

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Agonistic Ethics and the Burden of Office

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1. Introduction
2. Pragmatism and pluralism in ethics
3. Grandeurs, limits and scandals as groping mechanisms
4. Ethics, ethos and leadership
5. The burden of office, social capital and civility
6. Conclusion

Notes for a presentation at the annual seminar for general/flag officers, sponsored by the Chief of the Defence Staff, on the general theme Ethics in the Military Profession: a Structure for Ethical Behaviour, held at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto on January 20-21, 1996.
"Loyalty is a dog without moral judgment"

Joseph Tussman

1. Introduction

It is with fear and trembling that a layman ventures into a company of professionals to debate moral issues. Such groups have oaths of various sorts, and loyalties to principles, values and to each other, that the layman cannot always easily fathom. So at best, in moments of serenity, the layman’s observations are like the maps of the early days of cartography - elegant but not helpful to navigation. At worst, in moments of crisis, his disquisitions are likely to be irrelevant - "lecturing on navigation when the ship is going down" as W.H. Auden would put it.

So why did I accept this invitation? First, because of my strong belief in the burden of office of all citizens in a democracy to engage in deliberation about all issues of import; and the theme of this seminar is important. Second, because I feel, with Joseph Tussman, that often "it is only when we see things out of context that we really understand them" [Tussman 1989:14].

Therefore it is as an alien - but also as an amicus curiae - that I address the questions that you are raising in this seminar.

My knowledge of your specific terrain is limited. I have had the privilege of meeting a number of military officers in our MBA program over the years. Like so many other professionnals, they suffer from a fixation on rules. This translates into a low tolerance for ambiguity, a fear of mistakes and of any moral vacuum. Indeed, professionals of all stripes would appear to have the yearning for a fixed point by reference to which all could be gauged, measured, evaluated.

This sort of quest is not necessarily very fruitful for, as I have argued elsewhere, there is no such Archimedean point from which to assess moral claims [Paquet 1991]. But this does not mean that we are condemned to live with ethical nihilism or in a Tower of Babel.

In the next sections, I will make the case for an agonistic ethics à la Isaiah Berlin - from the Greek word AGON meaning competition, rivalry, conflict of characters in tragic dramas [Gray 1995:1] - and explore how one can make moral sense in the presence of conflictive and incommensurable alternatives without the comfort of universal ethical rules or codes. Much of my argument hinges on the all important notion of "burden of office" as defined in moral contracts, and on the centrality of discussion, dialogue and deliberation.

As will become clear, I do not disagree with Colonel Wakin [Wakin 1981] when he argues that by becoming a transformational leader one may resolve moral dilemmas. I simply feel that one cannot presume that all armed forces senior personnel will become instantly transformational leaders. Indeed, to the extent that there is lack of trust in the persons in authority to begin with, such a transition from a transactional to a transformational perspective (to use Colonel Wakin’s terminology) is extremely difficult. In the absence of this perfect sharing of vision by all, is there anything we can do?
2. Pragmatism and pluralism in ethics

We live in times of moral crisis. Professionals everywhere are "demoralized". They long for a moral gauge. Indeed, this is a demoralization that goes beyond the ranks of the "professionals". The citizen would also appear to have lost his moral anchor and civic commitment is disappearing. This sort of diagnosis has been forthcoming in all sorts of forums and from many different pulpits [Etchegoyen 1991; Wilson 1993; Putnam 1995, 1996]. This has led to crusades to define strategies and strategems to "remoralize" our societies. This has been the case in business, communication, research, etc. The military profession has not been spared, nor should it have been, for the dilemmas it is confronted with are, if anything, more agonistic that those faced by most professions.

This is not to deny that there are a few absolutes (slavery or torture are never justified, primum non nocere - above all do no harm- etc.). But they are not helpful to navigation, because of the fact that reality is agonistic. So, in the face of our "moral crisis", the multiplication of various codes of ethics is more a sign of despair than a measure of success in dealing with the problem.

Ethics, when it is not applied to trivial issues, deals with choice among incommensurables. Consequently, any theory that purports to provide answers to ethical dilemmas is first led to try to gauge incommensurable situations with a single rod. It is hardly surprising that this approach has failed. For in order to provide a solution, the theory must reduce incommensurables to commensurability. In so doing, the original problem is usually transmogrified beyond recognition.

This search for commensurability is a trivialization of ethics and provides no practical answers to ethical dilemmas.

This anti-theory point of view is not designed to comfort anyone. Indeed, the intent is exactly the reverse: to ensure that those interested in moral issues recognize from the start that there is no such thing as "moral comfort". Ethics is by definition "agonistic ethics" - an ethics of conflict of rivalrous goods and evils where dilemmas are insoluble, undecidable by rational reflection. [Clarke and Simpson 1989]. The rationalistic normative theories (utilitarianism, contractarianism, rights-based principles, etc.) are futile because they wrongly deny the existence of irresolvable conflicts and because they are swayed by simplistic universalism (i.e. the belief that universal rules are discoverable that would arbitrate all moral dilemmas).

There are many experts still persuaded that a quest for a "gospel" of one sort or other is still worth pursuing. Yet these approaches are easily shown to be flawed. In the name of utilitarianism, one falls into a total disrespect for the individual; rights-based approaches condone the most awesome inequities; as for the Rawlsian contractarian approach, it is silent as to the nature of the redistribution it might command to ensure a satisfactory allocation of primary goods. Consequently, there are no clear acceptable criteria for action that can be derived from these general principles because they are all too completely disconnected from a full appreciation of context and therefore are of no practical use [Paquet 1994].
Value-relativism is often presented as the only alternative to universal principles: it is the world of "anything goes". This appears rather abhorrent to most and this is the reason why pluralism regarded as a halfway house has acquired such a good press [Kekes 1993]. Pluralism is first and foremost against monism. Pluralists reject the view that there is only one system of values leading to the good life. They must however agree to find some ground to impose reasonable limits on what is acceptable and some justification for imposing these limits on possibilities that individuals may pursue. While relativists do not believe that any such limits can have an objective basis, pluralists do. But how can this be done?

For those like Aristotle who regard moral reasoning as reflexion in action, deliberation or "argumentation - among particular people, in specific situations, dealing with concrete things, with different things at stake" [Toulmin 1988] is at the core of morality. Judgment is embodied in action. A reflective conversation with the situation resolves moral issues in the same manner as it resolves the problem faced by an industrial designer: in both case, the challenge is to find a form that fits the circumstances given the constraints. When the designer interacts with the situation, this interactive process triggers the generation of a goodness of fit between two intangibles - a form that has not yet been designed and a context that cannot be properly and fully described because it is still evolving. [Alexander 1964; Cloutier et Paquet 1988; Paquet 1991].

This sort of conversation with the situation can be conducted in a variety of forums. A particularly striking example of success is GATT - the General Agreement on Tarifs and Trade - also dubbed by economists the General Agreement on Talking and Talking - which succeeded in generating through deliberation a reduction of the average level of duties on imports from some 45% in the late 1940s to inconsequential levels in the 1990s. Another forum of great import in Parliament which may most ineffective from a Taylorian point of view but which succeeds in bringing forth a workable consensus on a very large number of complex issues.

In these conversations with the situation, the individual is never alone. Indeed it is the multilogue about the situation that yields the moral solution. A community of rational dialogue is "a process of moral self-discovery that will lead lead us to a better insight into our own ends and a firmer grasp of our own subjectivity" [Beiner 1983]. But such communication cannot occur in a social vacuum. It is best conducted within a context of trust and collegiality. For that reason, it is best carried out at the local level: neither emerging from universal principles nor confined to an individual, but emanating from a forum where the problems are defined and the values consolidate jointly [Elster 1992]. At that local level, one strives for a more or less free and undistorted conversation within a context characterized by a sense of community.

These two characteristics (undistorted communication distorted and a modicum of shared beliefs) are important.

The conversation cannot be fruitful and the requirements of justification, contestation and innovation that are at the core of moral reasoning cannot usually materialize, unless both these conditions are realized.
Without justification, dialogue is 'dialogue de sourds': there is no social learning. Without contestation, there is no way to ensure freedom from the trappings of ideology and bigoted values. And without innovation and a capacity to reframe the issues, moral reasoning may end up being stalled: moral imagination is therefore a central requirement for "we need the ability to imagine and to enact transformation in our moral understanding, our character and our behaviour. In short, we need an imaginative rationality that is at once insightful, critical, exploratory and transformative" [Johnson 1993:187].

But how can one ensure that these conditions are met? We cannot!

The goodness of fit or ethical fitness of any outcome depends on a quality of community and communication that are rarely perfectly realized. The shared beliefs are always more limited than they should and the communication is always more distorted than it should. The official never operates in an environment that provides maximal trust level and there are always interferences preventing the conversation to proceed unimpeded. The weaker the supportive ethos and the more easily distorted the communication system, the less meaningful the conversation, and the less effective is the process of social learning.

It may be argued that these conditions of moral reasoning are unlikely to be realized and that, in matters of life and death, when time is of the essence, this sort of system is indeed unlikely to show a high degree of marksmanship. And yet good-enough moral reasoning is possible.

3. Grandeurs, limits and scandals as groping mechanisms

One may reasonably hope for some loose identification of a broad zone of feasible or acceptable solutions. Such a zone emerges and comes to be identified negatively through the cumulative rejection of families of solutions that are unacceptable for various reasons: it is approximated in a continuous way by the on-going operations of three parallel mechanisms - grandeurs, limits and scandals.

By ordres de grandeur, one means the order of priority, as for instance when it is firmly established that hospitals exist first and foremost for the benefits of patients, even though there are many more groups of stakeholders (medical doctors, nursing personnel, etc.) whose fate depends on the way hospitals are organized. When it is a matter of life and death, one must reach an active agreement which may not be a universal principle but an agreement that will apply in certain types of situations, with the provision that a different convention might be called for in different circumstances. Relative orders of priority are therefore determined as much by principles as by circumstances. And an accord is reached on conventions on the understanding that an alternative convention may be necessary under different circumstances. This does not presume that one can or must rank-order priorities since it is impossible to choose between incommensurables. However, one may presume that there may be a de facto agreement on a certain priority hic et nunc in full recognition that other equally valid priorities may prevail in other circumstances: a normal person must be able to shift from situations calling for one ordre de grandeur to another calling for a different one another within the same day [Boltanski 1990].
The channel through which one convention may be said to prevail is the testing ground of day-to-day reality. The reality checks test the viability of the convention and its limits. While the convention may be unwritten and rather fuzzy, the process of on-going justification will allow to determine the limits of the unacceptable: the boundaries beyond which the convention cannot be said to hold. It is only through a very oblique process that these limits are defined. As circumstances evolve, limits may become clearer: the evolutionary ethos registers and synthesizes the multiple logics in a syncretic cumulative jurisprudence. This jurisprudence acts as a collective compass operating within the constraints of a fuzzy and confusing terrain that is much like a palimpsest - the ancient parchment on which one scratches the old text to write the new one and which at any particular moment communicates more or less imperfectly an amalgam of superimposed messages.

In this evolutionary process, scandals act as révélateurs to signal brutally that certain limits have been trangressed in a gross manner. There is some randomness in the scandal-generating process: not all scandalous situations generate scandals and often they arise for the wrong reason and in locations in the forum that might not be the ones that would deserve the most attention and the most blame. Moreover, scandals have a life of their own: they are focalized and dramatized by the medias when they are not completely stage-managed by them; the reaction to scandals is also often a knee-jerked one: denial, camouflage, rationalization, or enactment of a corrective that is often not dealing with the root cause or source of the difficulties.

Grandeurs, limits and scandals are closely inter-linked. They are at the source of some social learning and combine (1) to confirm or modify the broad moral contract linking a professional group to the citizenry and (2) to elicit sets of practices that would appear justifiable for the particular community.

The ethos is an amalgam of moral contract and sets of practices: it is defined in the dictionary as "the sum of characteristic usages, ideas, standards, and codes by which a group is differentiated and individualized from other groups". It is an intangible set of traits that affect fundamentally the appreciative system. Deliberation is obviously moulded and informed by this ethos even though it may be largely implicit and unconscious. And the accumulation of judgments (as a result of conversation, justification, contestation and innovation) both discloses and elicits a "set of readinesses to distinguish some aspects of the situation rather than others and to classify and value these in this way rather than that". These readinesses constitute an evolving appreciative system that has to be learned; valuation is a skill, and at any time, the appreciative system is "necessarily limiting as well as enabling" [Vickers 1965].

The mechanics through which these readinesses evolve is habitualized choice over time, social learning. The acquisition of knowledge and know how becomes embodied in habits, practices, patterns of behaviour, propensities and institutions. Indeed, it is through the emergence, development, transformation and evolution of this appreciative system (and of the rules, conventions and norms in which it is instituted) that a community does its remembering and forgetting, its recognizing and classifying [Douglas 1986].
4. Ethics, ethos and leadership

Social learning is the driving force unleashed by deliberation and generates double-looped learning (i.e. not only a learning of better means to reach given objectives but also a learning of new goals, values and objectives as circumstances change) [Argyris and Schon 1974]. Ensuring that the conversation is conducted in a manner likely to foster social learning requires a process of adaptation of values and an improvement of the "goodness of fit" between values and context.

In order for the social system to adapt (i.e., to learn) as much and as fast as possible, some basic conditions must be realized. In a somewhat programmatic way, to foster good-enough social learning (and thereby a viable pragmatic ethic) (1) the conversation must be conducted with tact and civility and (2) within a context where the ethos is sufficiently rich and supportive (i.e., for instance, in communities or groups small enough to make possible the avventura comune). Professions would appear to be such communities.

Tact would appear to be a very limited requirement for the conversation to yield social learning. Indeed, many have felt that it cannot be a sufficient condition. Yet, Gadamer (quoted by Kingwell) defines tact as "a particular sensitivity to situations, and how to behave in them, for which we cannot find any knowledge from general principles". This is a screening not at the level of the types of problems or issues to tackle, but at the level of the permissible arguments: it embodies the basic condition for the conversation to continue - a dual requirement of not saying just anything that comes to mind and of keeping a certain openness vis-à-vis the arguments of others [Kingwell 1995].

With regard to the sort of 'communautarian' fabric likely to support a fruitful conversation, it is difficult to establish precise conditions for its emergence for it may originate in various ways and be woven according to quite different logics. It is clear however that the conversation is much more fruitful in a 'contextualist' world of multiplexed relations of mutual interdependence and caretaking, of group-oriented social relations. In a network society like Japan, the 'contextualist' culture has been shown to facilitate greatly conversation and social learning on a large scale [Kumon 1992].

In our societies, the 'contextual fabric' is less rich and dense in general than in Japan, but networking is ever present on a smaller scale, in the world of professions for instance. And the military context is one of the most tightly-knitted professional network. It is laced with a multitude of ceremonials that have built over time an extraordinary esprit de corps but also a very robust ethos. While some aspects of the current moral contract between the military and the citizenry may have to be renegotiated and some aspect of the 'pragmatic ethic' in good currency in the field may be in need of repairs, the military profession has an immense comparative advantage in this task because of the fact that it can count on this robust foundational social capital, on this underground of ceremonials and symbols that are providing a robust underpinning for trust and esprit de corps and a most fertile ground for social learning [Putnam 1995].

This rich symbolic context of rituals and ceremonials is a propitious terrain for effective social
learning but it cannot ensure that the double-looped social learning will necessarily evolve sufficiently rapidly and in the direction of goodness of fit. Indeed the current moral crisis has been triggered by scandals, debates about priorities and a sense that certain limits have been ignored. The conversation has degenerated into harangue, and, in certain segments of the forum, it might even be said that the conversation has stopped altogether. The military profession does not appear to be openly debating the nature of the much needed renewed moral contract with the citizenry and they do not give the impression to the citizenry that they are conducting internally the necessary critical conversation about their present practices. Could it be that the military profession suffers from learning disabilities?

Our immune system is a complex adaptive system that is bombarded constantly by new bacteria and viruses. It must learn fast for us to survive. Sometimes, it becomes necessary to use a 'lever' to help the immune system learn faster about the disease. The same may be said about any social system. Even though the military profession in Canada may be said to have a rich ethos, the conversation may have to be helped along if the double-looped learning is to proceed at a good-enough pace. Leadership is the leavening force in this case.

Leadership in the military profession has often been somewhat mistakenly regarded as a forceful top-down thrust provided by those in authority. This view of leadership was derived from a notion of governance characterized by hierarchy and vertical lines of command. As the conventional wisdom would have it, on the battlefield, there is little place for anything but obedience and loyalty.

It may be, even though I much doubt it, that there was a time in the past when leadership was about such top-down authoritarian levers. What is most certain is that anything of substance that we have learned about leadership in the last decades would appear to point in a very different direction. Effective leaders lead change bottom-up by reflecting the values of their followers, after having done much listening. For effective leaders are principled but also pragmatic. They tend to bring their followers beyond their limits, but not unreasonably fast and not unreasonably beyond such limits.

To be followers, team members must first respect their leader and be persuaded that their welfare is the objective of the leader. Followers need respect. To act paternalistically toward followers - even for their own good - is to deny them "the basic right of individual dignity". The burden of office for a leader is therefore first a requirement to listen and to "refine the public views in a way that transcends the surface noise of pettiness, contradiction and self-interest" [O’Toole 1995:10-12]. The leader must earn the trust of his followers by persuading them that he has their needs and aspirations at heart. The leader’s ability to lead, as O’Toole would put it, is a by-product of the trust he has earned by serving them [O’Toole 1995:28].

This bottom-up leadership cannot play itself out unless the leader and the followers develop a capacity to appreciate the limits imposed by mutual obligations. This is a typical case of prisoner’s dilemma.

5. The burden of office, social capital and civility
The norms of reciprocity, trust and mutual obligations necessary to get out of the dilemma can emerge even in a world of ego-centered actors [Axelrod 1984]. In a richer context laced with community spirit, the likelihood of some cooperation-promoting social machinery emerging is even higher [Poundstone 1992]. The conversation is therefore likely to elicit the requisite leadership relationships in the military profession. Tact and civility may indeed be sufficient conditions for the burden of office to be translated into effective leadership and for the ethics of reciprocity to elicit the requisite cooperation between leaders and followers.

The nature of the burden of office of the bottom-up leader is best illustrated by Jan Carlzon, the CEO of Scandinavian Airlines and author of Moments of Truth [Carlzon 1987]. When he had occasion to explain how he had chosen to empower his employees and to make them totally responsible for the fifty million "moments of truth" that occur annually when an employee of the company has a direct one-on-one contact with a customer, he was often asked how many of these "moments of truth" had gone sour. Carlzon always readily confessed that there had been half a dozen serious instances of costly errors in approximately six years. When asked how the employees responsible for costly errors had been punished, he always answered "Punish them? Why should we have punished them when it was our fault? We believe the task of leaders ... is to articulate the values of the organization, to create a system in which people can be productive, and to explain the goals that the system was established to achieve... If we in top management had done those jobs properly... those few errors would not have occurred. That is why we went back to evaluate our own communication skills" [O'Toole 1995:59].

The official is "a person with duties and obligations, not merely an insatiable center of gigantic appetites, a person with things to do that may be the death of his private self, that may make the office seem less an opportunity than a burden. And sometimes, even without the aid of flaws, a tragic burden. In fact, if we do not understand the office and its burdens we may not understand about tragedy" [Tussman 1989:15].

When a group is demoralized, when the junior officials have lost their trust in their leaders, we are faced with a form of vertical solitude. This phenomenon has been gauged very precisely through surveys, and the results have been published in the case of the Canadian public service [Zussman and Jubes 1989]. But in most cases, surveys are conducted that reveal the lack of trust of junior officials in their leaders but the leaders are quite satisfied to ascribe such results to extraneous circumstances or to the flaws of their subordinates. It is rare that leaders accept their burden of office and take responsibility for this state of affair.

Leadership is first and foremost a moral issue. It is based fundamentally on a conversation between leader and followers in which the burden of office of the leader entails listening carefully and taking responsibility. In that sense, the leader is a servant. And the remoralization of a demoralized group is posing a challenge not unlike the resolution of a prisoner’s dilemma. The solution requires that one finds ways to embed the problem into a broader context or a longer time horizon.

An overarching convention like the Mafia’s OMERTA or the awareness that cooperation is preferable in the context of repeated games are ways to break out of a setting likely to trigger
defaulting by both leaders and followers and therefore to cause the demise of the organization.

The Trojan horse through which remoralization is likely to proceed is the modification of the organizational culture and better use of the social capital of trust on which it is built. This in turn can be effected only if we understand well the way in which goodness of fit between values and context is arrived at through elimination of misfits (i.e. by error-correction as we do as we learn how to swim) [Alexander 1964] by making good use of our appreciative system.

In the military profession, there is an extraordinary transformational power built into the ceremonials and rituals associated with daily life. This is observed even by lay persons when they suggest that they would welcome a military education for their children. It is that this education is not only imparting knowledge and skills (savoirs and savoir-faire) but also a strong dose of personal development and savoir-être. This savoir-être is often tacit and most certainly not simply manners or étiquette; it becomes part of the fabric of the trainee. It allows him or her to take instinctively a responsible decision in the face of complex and uncertain circumstances. No one would suggest that this military education is perfect, but it most certainly makes the highest and best use of ceremonials and rituals to enrich the contextual fabric and thereby it is a conduit to an important accumulation of social capital (in the sense of Putnam) as part of the military ethos.

Nothing short of a full renegotiation of the moral contract between the military profession and the citizenry and the highest and best use of the social capital accumulated by the military in its training will do. Rituals and ceremonials may help leaders in their efforts to rekindle the capacities to recognize the ethical dimensions, to make good use of moral reasoning and moral imagination, and to live with ambiguity and disagreement [Powers and Vogel 1980].

How these renewed ‘capacities’ will crystallize into general proclivities or readinesses to react in certain patterned ways may not be entirely clear. But it is certain that this will not materialize in the form of guiding general principles. It will rather take the form of process-oriented practices likely to accommodate divergences while maintaining a certain sense of direction. Moreover we may not be able to hope for anything more than tacit standards of conduct. This is the case in a world where acting à la Carlzon might mean not that one is celebrated as a good leader but rather that, as a result of this very candour, one has increased his likelihood of being court-marshalld. In this context, our court-driven society would appear to stand in the way of moral leadership.

Some system of survival will undoubtedly emerge but it may not be as principled as one might like. It may well be it will resemble the one stylized facetiously by Warren Bennis some twenty years ago and based on the three cardinal rules of behaviour supposedly given to fledgling diplomats by the British Foreign Service: "(1) never tell a lie, (2) never tell the whole truth, and (3) never miss a chance to go to the bathroom" [Bennis 1976:114].

5. Conclusion
In this context, the armed forces may have some difficulty negotiating explicitly a new moral contract with the citizenry especially in times of fiscal pressure when governments are prone to regard the defense budget as a prime candidate for unilateral cuts. But if it is to be done, it will call for a much greater presence and voice of the military profession up front in the public forum and a significant change from the old strategy of minimizing visibility to avoid criticism.

The armed forces may also find it difficult to refurbish their process-oriented and tacit standards at a time when recent scandals have put them in a goldfish-bowl context. They may also underestimate the central importance of the social capital of ceremonials and rituals especially in an era when such rituals serve as sharp external signs of distance between the citizenry and the armed forces. Yet these distinguishing features are a powerful basis to help develop a moral sense. The emphasis on ceremony, tact and civility nurtures a more fruitful dialogue, greater moral sensitivity, and carries with it a better appreciation of the burden of office as the vehicle through which one may learn to live with situations plagued by incommensurability and agonizing conflicts.

While much of the moral sense will remain tacit (and indeed should be preserved of the rigor mortis of official codes), it requires a firm foundation (1) in a well-understood moral contract between the armed forces and the citizenry and (2) in a valued social capital of ceremonials and trust that connoted the moral sensitivity that is supposed to characterize the armed forces. For the citizenry expects higher moral standards from the armed forces than it expects from itself. It is only on that condition that the citizenry provides the military profession with additional latitudes in the use of violence. An ever present ceremonial may serve as a reminder of these additional moral responsibilities. Without them, there is a danger that this aspect of the moral contract with the citizenry will tend to wane.

For the leaders of the armed forces, this dual moral responsibility vis-à-vis the citizenry and vis-à-vis their followers is quite daunting. It is of the same order as the responsibility of the political leaders vis-à-vis the citizenry and the bureaucrats [Paquet and Pigeon 1995]. Yet there is always such potential life-and-death dimensions to the decisions by the military profession that the stakes are even higher for them than for the politicians.

While it may appear that betting on civility as a foundation for the on-going conversation and thereby for the construction of the social conventions we use to govern ourselves [Brown 1995] is quite a gamble, one cannot but feel re-assured when one observes the outcomes of deliberations that were effectively dominated by civility. Vaclav Havel has used this very word civility as his guiding principle, and he has presented the most difficult decision he has had to make - presiding over the dissolution of Czechoslovakia - as an exercise in civility [O’Toole 1995:259]. The challenge for the military profession today in Canada is to invent a renewed moral contract and new moral conventions based on this principle: an Havelian approach to life in the Canadian armed forces and to the rapports between the military profession and the citizenry in our land might not be a bad way to tackle this task.

References


