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A Liberalism is a doctrine about the external organization of society. It is silent on the more important question: How shall we live? A Michael Lind

Introduction

Pluralism is a world view that defines societies as fragmented and discontinuous, composed of different complementary/conflictive parts or spheres that are incommensurable, and therefore cannot be reduced to a single logic. In plural societies, there is a constant and active process of reconciliation, harmonization, and effective coordination of the logics in these different spheres to ensure a minimal degree of coherence, resilience, and effective learning.

Citizenship is a covenant based on the values, principles, and reciprocal privileges and responsibilities that define our ways of living together. Therefore, in a plural society, citizenship cannot be anything but plurielle B i.e., limited and multiple B for the citizen in such a world has multiple and limited relationships, and multiple, limited, and overlapping identities (Cairns 1999).

Many political scientists and jurists are critical of this notion of limited/multiple citizenships. To bring commensurability to the incommensurable, they routinely reduce this rich and variegated nexus of values, principles, privileges and responsibilities connoting citizenship to a common denominator, for the purposes of governance, by granting politics a transcendent role. Through a sleight of hand, they invent a projection of this n-dimensional socio-economic reality (that citizenship synthesizes) onto a single transcendent plane where all agents are defined as equivalent and equipotent, and make it the sole locus of citizenship. The citizen becomes an être de raison operating in the transcendent plane of politics, a sort of smallest common denominator soul in all agents..

In such an ethereal world, there is a denial of diversity, no possibility of considering any differences within the n-dimensional world, and a refusal to establish lucid and responsible rankings among dimensions. This reductionism is even presented as the essence of democracy: inferring that without the transcendence of politics, democracy would not prevail (Gauchet 1998).

I argue that plural societies need a much richer notion of citizenship. The argument is developed in four stages. First, I describe in a cursory way the stratagem of the public sphere as a sanitized locus for agent-state intercourse, and show the limitations of this strategy on which politics has built its purported dominium. Second, I suggest an analytical framework to explore various crucial dimensions of citizenship. Third, I develop a broader notion of citizenship, one rooted in civil society and in the notion of moral contracts, and I show how it is likely to be better adapted to pluralist contexts. Four, I consider rapidly the different ways in which Canada and Australia are drifting toward this position.
1. **Pluralism and the perils of transcendent politics**

The notion of open society (Bergson 1934; Popper 1942) suggests societies that have escaped the dominance of holistic values, and have managed to put the individual at the center of the stage. In the traditional stylizations of this open society, one finds a private sphere for the individual, where his negative freedom (freedom from constraints) is guaranteed through arrangements like private property, and a public sphere where an *État de droit* regulates the relationships between individuals and between the individuals and the state (Reszler 1990). The restricted power of the state is meant to ensure that the society will never be allowed to be closed.

A pluralist society is a much richer concept than open society. It goes beyond this notion of negative freedom and calls for "un ensemble composé (à compartiments) librement aggloméré" where the constituent parts maintain a good portion of their original autonomy. These sectors are regarded as "autant de domaines irréductibles, en interaction permanente...chaque sphère particulière trouve son expression dans un pouvoir à part... à la division des pouvoirs correspond ... une véritable démultiplication des allégeances" (Reszler 1990).

Plural societies are societies that explicitly recognize that individuals and groups are motivated by different values, and that they can legitimately have different value systems. To pursue their different objectives, they require positive freedom: capacity and opportunity to actively and effectively pursue these values, and the elimination of the constraints or unfreedoms that prevent them from doing so. Moreover, plural societies deny that there is any constantly overriding value (Kekes 1993:19). This entails the inevitability of conflicts, and the need to develop reasonable conflict-resolution mechanisms based on some core credo (however minimal) that the disputants may share. While the plurality of conceptions of a good life increases the range of valued possibilities, not all possibilities are reasonable. So there is also a need for limits, and for the justification for such limits as excluding unreasonable possibilities, or unreasonable ways of pursuing them, or ways that might simply maximize conflicts.

The central strategy of many political scientists and jurists in the face of plural societies has been to focus on finding complexity-reducing devices for the purpose of governance.

One favorite stratagem has been the reductive assumption that there are only two sectors: the private and the public sphere. According to this device, there is a private sphere relying on a right to privacy, and a public sphere where individuals interact under the aegis of the state. It is in this public space that citizenship is nested, and that the citizen participates in a restricted way (through representation in Parliament) to give a voice to *la volonté générale*.

For those who defend such a dichotomy, the two spheres represent the private and public faces of the lifeworld of individuals. Groups and communities are simply considered as insignificant symbolic markers, citizenship pertains to the public sphere, and is dominated by state-agent relations. This occluding of communities, and the emphasis on the private-public dichotomy and the vertical notion of citizenship associated with it, are both altogether too Manichean and unduly reductive.
The real plural world is much more complex and characterized by deep diversity: it is filled with communities (real and imagined), there are many more spheres, and they all overlap to such an extent that it is of little use to build any analysis on the assumption of tightly compartmentalized spheres (Janoski 1998; Paquet 2000a, 2001a). Consequently, citizenship cannot be restricted to the public sphere. State, market, private, and public spheres and there may be others in the material and symbolic orders overlap to such a significant degree that it is unreasonable to limit the ambit of citizenship to the state sphere. Indeed, as T.H. Marshall (1964) would put it, the development of the nexus of privileges and obligations defining citizenship has evolved sufficiently that it has invaded all spheres (market, state, private, public, etc.).

Moreover, citizenship cannot be reduced to state-agent relations. At a certain level of generality, political scientists and jurists recognize that citizenship is fundamentally a dual relationship between the members of the political community and the political authority and the state, and horizontal amongst members of the community. But they overemphasize the former relation to such an extent that the notion of citizenship becomes therein totally absorbed (Cairns 1999; Jenson and Papillon 2000).

The bias toward the vertical is based on the special importance of the public sphere, and of politics and state within it, through the process of political representation. Politics and state are purported to play a transcendent role as the agent of transfiguration of society ANé élévation tranfiguratrice de la société (Gauchet 1998:112). And there is a quasi-doctrinaire belief that it is a necessary elevation, since only politics, through the process of conflicts among parties and collective adversaries, can lead to a meaningful taking-into-account of the common good (Mouffe 1993). For those holding that view, the state is the centre of the public sphere and the privileged locus of the conflicts between power groups. Consequently, any relativization of the role of the state can only be regarded as a deplorable erosion of the political, even though the state is said, by the same persons, to have generated a primat de la représentation des acteurs sur la résolution des problèmes qu’ils posent (Gauchet 1998:123).

It is our view that in a modern, pluralist, knowledge-based socio-economy, there is no privileged or transcendent locus of conflict, and, therefore, that the valence of politics and state is considerably overstated. In a more realistic approximation of the socio-economy, the horizontal (community) relationships are as important (or perhaps even more important) as the vertical ones. The reduction in the relative importance of the stato-political, any disenchantment of the political, or any drift toward a reduction of the intermediation role of the political (Touraine 1999), or its implosion or its reconfiguration in new sites all this means a shift from government to governance (Paquet 1999a).

Governance may be defined as effective coordination when resources, information and power are distributed. Citizenship -- in a context of governance -- means the ensemble of values, principles, reciprocal privileges and responsibilities that define the nexus of moral contracts. These contracts constitute the necessary social technologies of coordination capable of bringing forth good life in all its various senses for the different agents. The perils of maintaining a fixation on the stato-political are clear. Since citizenship is a nexus of relationships dominated not by the state but by a much richer array of relations throughout the socio-economy, the fixation on the political can only rob the notion of citizenship of much of its meaning.

2. An analytical framework
Refusing to reduce citizenship to the realm of the political does not suffice, however. One must suggest an alternative and broader framework within which citizenship might be usefully analyzed. While there are many monist schemes playing up one dimension of citizenship or the other, none of the efforts at producing an acceptable synthetic scheme has been totally successful. This is ascribable to the very nature of the societies that have become plural through historical times: no single template would appear to be applicable to all. At this stage of the debates, one can only hope to identify an analytical framework set of relationships that do not lead to specific conclusions about the world of events...(but) may be looked upon as the mold out of which the specific types of theories are made (Leibenstein 1976:17-18).

We have identified three major dimensions to be taken into account in a classificatory scheme presented in Figure 1 (Paquet 1992, 2001b).

(1) The first dimension pertains to the dichotomy between material and symbolic orders. This notion has emerged clearly from the works of Raymond Breton, among others, and has contributed to broadening the debate on culture in Canada (Breton 1984). The insistence on the importance of the symbolic order has allowed the discussion to escape from the traps of traditional analyses of interest groups = demand for material or financial gratifications. The broader analysis has focused on problems of collective identity (traditions, customs, norms, genre de vie, etc.) that are embedded in the forms and styles of private and public institutions. It has re-affirmed something that is often forgotten, i.e., that the symbolic order underpins the workings of the material order and is also a prime target of government interventions (Tussman 1977).

For Breton and others, the construction of the symbolic order is as important as the construction of the material socio-economy. Citizens traditionally have sought a certain concordance between their private way of life (their culture) and the style of their public environment (their national identity). Their demand for status (that is, for recognition) will often be as vociferous as their demand for access to economic and political resources (Tully 2000). Indeed, recognition and redistribution are often alternative ways of transferring different sorts of capital. Governments of plural democracies must be increasingly involved in monitoring and understanding the symbolic order, and in intervening in it, both in response to demands by diverse groups, and in order to temper the behaviour of groups by reframing their representations and perceptions (Tussman 1989).

This more inclusive framework helps to provide the basis for interpretations encompassing "material" and "symbolic" dimensions, and in probing the growing centrality of recognition capital. Membership and identity are simply less structured forms of social and symbolic life, but they naturally either progress through the development of culture and institutions or fade away.
Figure 1  A problématique
(2) The second broad axis of the analytical block defines an increasing degree of formality in social arrangements: from membership, which may be regarded as a minimal set of conditions to belong to a club (the difference between members and strangers); to identification/identity, which is the subjective recognition of some salient features as the basis for self-categorization; to culture, which represents a somewhat formalized set of rules, laws, customs and rituals; to governance, which amounts to the development of a stable pattern of social interaction and institutions (Walzer 1983; Edwards and Doucette 1987; Roberts and Clifton 1990).

The notions of membership, identity, and culture are extremely difficult to define precisely. Essentialist definitions of belonging are anchored in certain traits. Others have insisted on some primordial features as determinant. A third group has fundamentally defined these notions in a relational way: shared differences that are the result of negotiated arrangements (Drummond 1981-2). In the first two instances, a number of ethnographic features are said to provide the basic or dominant characteristics necessary to qualify for membership (Nash 1989). In the last case, membership, identity and culture are in the nature of a persona, which is the result of a creative and interactive process through which relationships are constructed and evolve in a manner that makes them a matter of conventions and agreements with outsiders (Goldberg 1980).

In that sense, membership, identity and culture may be regarded as increasingly more complex forms of social glue or social capital (Coleman 1988). This sort of capital simultaneously provides the basis for differentiation, structuration, and integration: i.e., it serves to provide a basic partitioning based on negotiated differences, but also as a basis for assembling those disparate elements into a coherent whole (Porter 1979; Lussato 1989).

Since de facto heterogeneity may generate a segmentation of the social space in disconnected groups, and since such segmentation may well degenerate, through multiplex relationships, into cumulative processes accentuating and crystallizing such a segmentation, an increasing degree of balkanization and anomie of the segments may ensue (Gluckman 1967; Laurent and Paquet 1991). Consequently, it is crucial that we spell out these conventions, along with the pattern of rights and obligations of each party, if active and vibrant citizenship is to ensue, and not a mosaic of disparate groups in conflict on all fronts.

Membership will be easier to negotiate than identity, and identity easier than culture, but corresponding to these different degrees of cohesion, there are different types of "moral contracts" (Paquet 1991-1992).

(3) The third broad axis of the block identifies three complementary and yet intricately interwoven terrains of social integration: ethnos, nation, and civil society. These are the different grounds in which these moral contracts, however loosely negotiated or otherwise arrived at, are embedded. They are alternate/joint foundations for moral contracts.

The case of ethnos used to be regarded as quite distinct because of the fact that membership was perceived as rooted primarily in physical characteristics and the material order. But even ethnicity has tended to become more and more symbolic, so that growing importance has been given to symbolic recognition in defining ethnic boundaries (Gans 1979).
Ethnos, nation and civil society are different ways of anchoring membership and identity, and may be regarded as tending to become substitutes (or at least the basis for a complex compound) rather than being the basis of absolutely non-intersecting realities. Ethnos, nation and civil society are valid bases for discussing membership, identity, culture and governance, but depending on which one is the hegemonic terrain, the "moral contracts" will contain a different set of collective rights and obligations. Determining the valence of each terrain has therefore become crucial.

Such determination is difficult, and fraught with Manichean dogmas and nasty discussions that reveal the full powers of naivety and political correctness. Ethnos has become the target of many attacks because it is a source of exclusion. Indeed, the dichotomy between @bad@nationalism (ethnic based) and @good@nationalism (territorially, constitutionally based) has become a mantra. Connection between government and an ethnocultural nation upon which the nation-state is based has become regarded as @xenophobic, nativist and even fascist@ (Lind 2000:44).

In its place, the politically correct conventional wisdom has proposed a sort of @civic@nationalism as @progressive because it is committed to a political ideal@. This represents a subtle but futile stratagem to capture the @psychological economies of scale@ of the nation-state, without having to pay the price of ethnocultural commonality broadly defined. For, unfortunately, it would seem that @the ethnic nation is the largest community with which ordinary beings can have an emotional attachment@ (Lind 2000:46).

So far these attempts to completely exorcize ethnocultural dimensions having failed the test of reality. There has been a recent attempt to salvage the civic nationalism paradigm by insisting that ethnocultural dimensions may be factored in, but only as subsidiary/secondary features. These features are regarded as only important at the symbolic level, as a support system for the @liberal-civic-nationalist@ citizen whose @liberalism remains the only fundamental value. Michael Ignatieff has undergone such a minor conversion between 1993 and 2000 (Ignatieff 1993, 2000).

This has led to the emergence of a form of @boutique multiculturalism@ i.e., a multiculturalism one can invoke only in matters inconsequential, for as soon as there is an effort to leverage or parley these ethnocultural values into anything significant, the dominant liberal view of the individual-without-ethnocultural-qualities is used forcefully to forcefully trivialize the ethnocultural dimensions (Fish 1999).

This analytical block leaves a great deal of room for a wide variety of complex notions of citizenship, anchored in quite different terrains. This captures the central fact that citizenship as a set of ligatures (values, principles, reciprocal privileges and responsibilities) is an essentially contested concept – i.e., one about which reasonable persons may never agree (Gallie 1964) because it is a multidimensional concept, and different persons may legitimately put more emphasis on one aspect or another within the citizenship analytical block. What crystallizes as the relevant notion of citizenship is a set of ligatures or moral contracts defining a transversal syncretic entity within the citizenship analytical block: a mixture of values, principles, and reciprocal privileges and responsibilities that provides citizenship with its broad diffuse base and its syncretic unity.
3. Terms of integration and emergent transversal citizenship

In the process of defining citizenship as ligatures of all sorts, it is easy to understand how different groups may focus on different cells of the block. Ethnic membership may be regarded as the essential feature by some, while others may elect to emphasize symbolic identity in civil society exclusively. But in a world characterized by much spectrality—multiple memberships, limited identities, a mélange of ethnic/national/civil society identification and cultures, layered governance structures, and a most fluid boundary between the symbolic and the material world—citizenship is unlikely to be captured in one cell or dimension of the block. Indeed, and this is our main argument, citizenship is a transversal concept: it is nested in a diagonal cluster within the analytical block (Paquet 1989, 1994a, 1994b).

This means that citizenship might be regarded as a nexus of ligatures defining a covenant or pact cutting across the block, across the many boundaries, and attempting to reconcile in an evolutionary way the many different perspectives that coexist, within a given society or at the intersection of many societies, through a nexus of fluid “moral contracts” (Paquet 1991/1992). Moral contracts are more or less informal arrangements and conventions that embody values and norms on which people agree. They define mutual expectations, legitimate entitlements and obligations, and the corridor or boundary limits within which people have agreed to live.

Only such a transversal notion of citizenship, based on moral contracts, can capture the array of ligatures capable of meeting individuals’ complex needs for autonomy and belonging, the needs for responsibilities, and opportunities for participation in an active democracy, and the challenges of a spectral society with its new type of sociality based on weak ties. This notion of citizenship need not be univocal, since there are multiple citizenships anchored in different terrains, and there may be differentiated citizenships—in degree and in kind.

For instance, one can easily imagine a basic set of minimal norms corresponding to basic citizenship, but also differential levels of rights-cum-obligations that individuals and groups might choose in order to equilibrate their entitlements with the sort of responsibilities they are willing to accept (Paquet 1989). In the same manner, in a world of limited identities and multiple citizenships, one can imagine layers of citizenship corresponding to different pacts entered into by individuals or organizations. These may echo either different degrees of rootedness, or complementary ensembles of commitments, or, in some cynical scenarios, flags of convenience that can be used alternatively or strategically by individuals or organizations depending on circumstances.

In this context, the multiplication of citizenships has called for some ordering (strong or weak) if the notion is not to be trivialized. The notion of primary and subsidiary citizenships connotes a sense of priority among the different limited affiliations. This ordering cannot be embodied in a formal legal arrangement. At best, it would correspond to an always emergent and never fully crystallized meta-moral contract defining the relative valence of the different ligatures that make up individuals’ and organizations’ citizenships of all sorts (Paquet 1998).

(1) Coordinates
To facilitate the discussion, one might identify some important dimensions of citizenship as legal status, as participation in governance, and as belonging as illustrations of the range of meanings that might be attached to a transversal concept within the block, and of the wide array of flavors that can emerge as layers are multiplied, and one dimension or the other is emphasized. This is presented in Figure 2.

At one apex of this citizenship triangle is the liberal notion of citizenship, fundamentally rooted in the notion of legal status – a notion that is in good currency in the Anglo-Saxon world. Here, citizenship inheres in individuals, who are seen as the bearer of rights, and it is couched in a language of rights and entitlements. Citizens do not have to do anything, or at least not much, to become or remain citizens. It minimizes participation requirements and expects little sense of identification. This notion emphasizes the centrality of negative freedom (i.e., protection against interference with individual choices).

At a second apex is the civic republican view of citizenship. It is largely couched in terms of duties, and defines citizenship as a notion with a high valence to practice and participation. The citizen is a producer of governance. It calls on individuals to become members of the community, to participate in the culture and governance of the community. This concept emphasizes positive freedom (i.e., the person’s being able to do this or that, and the duty to help others in that respect).

A third apex emphasizes neither status nor participation, but the process of belonging. In this zone of the triangle, what is of central importance is the recognition, respect, esteem given to the individual-and-his-circumstances. There are two important variants of this polar case: one in which recognition is simply a mise en visibilité of some basic characteristics that are already there; and the second which focuses rather on the construction of status and differences by activism designed to transform the symbolic order (Tully 2000; Markell 2000).

These three ideal-type conceptions are only meant to illustrate the broad range of different notions of citizenship in good currency. One may find countries having anchored their notion of citizenship all over the terrain of the citizenship triangle, corresponding to different mixes of status, participation and belonging. In any concrete real-world situation, citizenship in a plural society is a transversal mix of these three components. Indeed, a given notion of citizenship condenses some of these dimensions, and represents a nexus of moral contracts that deals with these different dimensions in a particular way. Consequently, citizenship may cover a whole range of possible meanings with all sorts of intermediate cases giving different weights to each of these dimensions.

Moreover, one may easily imagine, as was suggested earlier, different layers of citizenship within which the individual may be embedded through his/her membership in different organizations, and a variety of families of citizenship within which individuals and organizations are nested as they take part in the different arrangements pertaining to different countries.
The citizenship triangle

Belonging

Participation          Status
Over the last few decades, the dynamics of the debates about citizenship have led to an evolution of the concept. From the original formulation of T.H. Marshall (1964) emphasizing the development of citizenship entirely in terms of rights (civil rights in the 18th century, political rights in the 19th century, and social rights in the 20th century), one has seen it evolve toward an ever greater importance being given to the participation aspects of citizenship, but also in ways that give more import to the whole dimension of belonging and symbolic recognition.

Moreover, there has been a tendency for the notion of citizenship not only to change the valence of these three components, but also to react to the ever greater liquidity and complexity of modern societies (Bauman 2000) by an increase in the degree of informality in the normativities embedded in the moral contracts, and by a multiplication of the contracts dealing with these more complex relationships (Paquet 2001a).

Instead of being absorbed into a simple, formal and legal linkage between the citizen and the state, the citizenship relationship has evolved into a looser but more encompassing covenant covering a web of relationships among members of the community, but also between them and the state.

Finally, the proliferation of multiple citizenships has heightened the complexity of these arrangements, and has generated a whole new set of problems for persons or organizations purporting to hold membership in many clubs at the same time. This has led both to ugly abuses of power (when a group of citizens has been branded by a paranoid state as likely to collaborate with the enemy as happened to Japanese Canadians during World War II), and to individuals and organizations using their “citizenship of convenience” to take opportunistic advantage of all possible entitlements while shirking the responsibilities of citizenship.

This should have led to debates about meaningful arbitrages among competing allegiances or at least to the emergence of a dominant logic acting as lodestar to guide collectivities in such choices. However, not all countries have had the fortitude to deal squarely with such problems. Many have found it politically incorrect to even raise these issues.

The emergence of the loose covenant that ensues faces many challenges. In two recent documents, Jenson and Papillon (1999, 2000) have identified some of them. One may underline a few of these challenges as a way of probing the process of construction of citizenship underway in all countries.

The first challenge has to do with the increasing diversity and specularity of the populations. It would appear that nothing less than a recognition of differential and asymmetric citizenships can do the job in a world where diversity and specularity entail a multiplicity of limited identities that may be complementary or competing. (Van Gusteren 1998; Paquet 2000b). Unless one can define some rank ordering among these attachments, citizenship becomes meaningless.
The second one has to do with the multiplication of the sites of citizenship. While the power and legitimacy of the nation-state would appear to be lessened, there are reasons to believe that this proliferation of sites of power is even more important when the ethnocultural basis of the society is more diverse.

When new entities at the supra-national and infra-national levels become meaningful actors, and alliances and joint ventures blur the old distinction between the state sphere and the rest of society, one must either firmly re-establish the state sphere to salvage the old notion of citizenship, or transform the notion of citizenship to deal with the new realities (Paquet 2000b). This latter route calls for citizenship to be broadened, and for new social ligatures and arrangements to be negotiated. While different groups may wish to obtain symbolic recognition, others may want some political autonomy or a portion of the economic surplus. This is true for groups at the local and regional levels, but particularly for ethnocultural groups.

The third challenge has to do with the evolving nature of solidarity. The old notion of citizenship associated with rights has simply been driven to extend rights to cover all sorts of social entitlements on the ground that social and political equality are linked. This has often been discussed in complete ignorance of a citizen’s responsibilities, and often rooted in the basic assumption that only the state could be trusted to take action with a view to the common good.

This has led to a strong emphasis on redistribution as a way to ensure that the so-called collective rights of communities would be honored, and on a reiteration of the importance of a strong central government as a source of redistribution – for only a centralized state can bring the requisite resources to the center, and redistribute them to lessen inequality. However, it is far from clear that redistribution (be it of material or symbolic resources) is the way.

A return to the principles of insurance might be a more appropriate response in a world of weaker ties and greater turbulence, where what one wants to encourage is a more efficient allocation of risk-taking through a wider use of risk-sharing (Paquet 2001c). And this refocusing may be all the more important if one accepts (even only in part) the argument of René Girard, who contends that reducing inequality by redistribution may increase the danger of envy and violence (Laurent and Paquet 1991).

A final challenge has to do with participation: i.e., taking part in the governance process. Again, this may take two forms. Either opening the political process through stratagems of inclusion, or accepting that citizenship does not necessarily have to be restricted to the political. This latter approach would require a broadening of the notion of citizenship to encompass more than individuals and communities, and the design of appropriate mechanisms to define and enforce the rights and responsibilities of these other ‘organizational entities’ (Paquet 1998).

There are daunting challenges in eliciting the requisite participation and engagement for a society to thrive and prosper when faced with a more and more variegated population in a more and more turbulent world.
The mix of negative and positive freedoms likely to provide the optimal integration (i.e., one capable of providing ample possibilities for differentiated citizenship while ensuring the minimal rules of engagement for the society to succeed) need not necessarily have evolved organically. One must therefore identify the ways in which the state wittingly or not is influencing the terms of integration.

4. Australian and Canadian musings

It is only since 1947 (Canada) and 1948 (Australia) that the members of these societies can claim Canadian or Australian citizenship. Before that time, these persons were either British subjects or without citizenship. One may reasonably ask whether this discontinuity per se has made any difference. The answer is not clear. It has obviously entailed the creation of some symbolic capital around the new label, but it is fair to say that, in and by itself, this relabelling has done little to effect the instant crystallization of a new identity. It has only triggered the process of learning about what it meant to be a citizen, for citizenship always remains en émergence.

This process of social learning has been experienced quite differently in Australia and Canada. Australia has tackled the issue more openly, frontally, and transparently. In Canada, the birth of citizenship came just a few years after a very divisive fracture in Canadian society created by the Conscription Crisis (Laurendeau 1962). This crisis split Canada along ethnic lines right at the core of World War II when the federal government tried to escape from a promise made to Quebec that it would not invoke conscription as a quid for the quo that constituted the agreement of Quebec to support Canada entering actively into the war effort. This particular experience was so traumatic (Quebec leaders being jailed) that it had quite a chilling effect on the post-war debates in Canada.

This has led both countries to enter these citizenship debates in quite different circumstances. In Australia, debates and documents registered progress in the emergence of a syncretic notion of citizenship. In Canada, the debates were muffled, the arguments less vibrant, and the documents not very clear as markers.

A preliminary examination of the two experiences suggests that the Australian approach has led to faster progress toward a clear definition of the meaning of citizenship. Most certainly, this issue has received more attention, has generated more debates, and has led to a much sharper sense of what constitutes the nexus of moral contracts making up citizenship in Australia than in Canada.

Yet, one should not conclude too hurriedly that the Canadian way has proved dysfunctional. A closer examination reveals that a slower process of social learning in Canada was not only well suited to the Canadian circumstances and ethos, but also a strategy not necessarily unhelpful in dealing with ever more complex citizenship issues in countries that do not have the robust debating culture of Australia – a strategy of small steps and ad hocery.

In this section, some hypotheses are put forward about the different routes that these two countries would appear to have followed over the last 50 years, about the different nexuses of
moral contracts that have emerged as a matter of consequence, and about the paradoxal efficiency of the Canadian approach.

(1) A few contrasts

One might suggest the following differences between Australia and Canada as deserving some probing:

* the importance of “citizen commitment” in Australia, and its relative unimportance in Canada; the centrality of discussions about the moral contract embodying this commitment in Australia, and the diffidence vis-à-vis any such discussions in Canada; and the consequent sense of the limits to tolerance that ensues in Australia as a result of the debates about the emergent moral contracts, while almost unlimited tolerance prevails in Canada because no norms have been agreed upon so a no-norm convention has emerged by default;

* a carefully constructed bottom-up social cohesion built on commitment in Australia, and a top-down mechanical social glue supposedly generated through redistribution of resources in Canada

* a capacity and taste for robust national debates in Australia, while in Canada there is a ‘sociality of consensus’ and a taste for obfuscation, irony and bricolage in the public sphere; and a certain differential in the degree of political correctness (higher in Canada than in Australia) which stunts seriously social debates in Canada and is a source of differential social learning between the two countries

(a) From the white Australia policy of yesteryear to the commitment to Australia expected from citizens today, there has been significant clarity in Australia’s position. In Canada, on the contrary, much has been done to equivocate. Canada’s immigration policy was almost as quasi-racist as Australia fifty years ago, but without being stated as bluntly as the Australians did. There is still great difficulty in Canada even today in accepting that this ever was the case. This hypocritical policy of obfuscation about an era when soft but effective discrimination was in force is easy to understand and is ascribable to the Quebec factor. It is not possible to debate openly the rights, responsibilities, values, participation, appartenance, etc. underlying the moral contracts of citizenship when a significant segment of the Canadian population of different ethno-cultural extraction has not been persuaded that such moral contracts are internally acceptable and provide for the identity and lifeworld of communities.

Indeed, as a result of the Quebec factor, the conditions for becoming a Canadian citizen have had to remain strategically ill-defined: at first, admission was based on opportunistically defined norms rooted in no clear principles; then it evolved toward the present situation where any person putting one foot on the tarmac at any Canadian airport is automatically granted almost all the rights of long term Canadians except the right to vote.

The recent granting of a “Canadian citizenship” to Nelson Mandela by the Parliament of Canada has gone further and expanded the definition of citizen to include someone who meets none of the standard criteria for citizenship. Whatever the merit of this particular individual,
the Canadian Parliament admitted into “our community of fate” someone who has only the most tenuous possible reciprocal relationship of obligation with other members of our community, and through this gesture, all but declared that there are no firm conditions for becoming a Canadian citizen, and did much to establish that it is simply an honorific title.

(b) Canadians as individuals are inclined to be much more demanding in their definition of citizenship than Canadian officials. They define it not only in terms of a bundle of rights and liberties, but also in terms of responsibilities, attitudes and identities. But public officials (for whom pragmatism is the dominant value) claim to have no concern about defining any such set of expectations about the terms of integration for newcomers on the ground that one cannot ask anything from newcomers that one does not require explicitly from native born. Making any additional demands from newcomers is branded automatically as intolerance, chauvinism or racism. As a matter of consequence, officials are not concerned much either about ensuring that newcomers are provided with the requisite help to make them capable of participating fully in the host society, and feel that they have no legitimate basis to refuse to modify the Canadian ways in response to requests by newcomers claiming that such ways constitute a discriminatory stance against them.

The result is not only a lack of debates in Canada about limits to tolerance and diversity, but a natural drift, as the jurisprudence cranks out case after case, toward a refusal to recognize that there are any limits. This is no longer pluralism but a leap of faith that if some form of limits prove necessary, they will emerge organically. This is quite a gamble since the required terms of integration are in fact likely to emerge only from a continuous renegotiation as the expectations and environments change, and to coalesce into an explicitation of rights and responsibilities but also of the limits to tolerance of the host society, and of the obligations this entails for the newcomers to adapt somewhat. This challenge, Canadian leaders refuse to confront.

To clarify these expectations, Australia has spelled out the content of the “Australian Compact” – seven basic principles based on “commitment” that Australian citizens must accept (Australian Citizenship Council 2000:82)

- to respect and care for the land we share
- to maintain the rule of law and the ideal of equality under the law
- to strengthen Australia as a representative liberal democracy
- to uphold the ideal of Australia as a tolerant and fair society
- to recognize and celebrate Australia as an inclusive multicultural society
- to continue to develop Australia as a society devoted to the well-being of its people
- to value the unique status of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.

Moreover, the community consultations conducted by the Australian Citizenship Council revealed that it was perceived by a majority of respondents that “Australian citizenship should be valued emotionally rather than purely as a way of gaining certain legal rights and

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1 In a survey of members of the Institute of Public Administration of Canada conducted by Iain Gow, it was found that respondents held a common outlook that included as basic tenets pragmatism and suspicion of theory (Gow 1994; Dwivedi and Gow 1999:21).
responsibilities…should also signify a commitment to Australia and to shared civic values” (92-93)

(c) The present Canadian refusal to engage in an exercise of definition of terms of integration is understandable but not inconsequential. The lack of a clear notion of the responsibilities of citizenship can only lead to a great fuzziness in the definition of the limits of tolerance. More than any other factor, the very reluctance of the Canadian government to foster debates leading to a clear articulation of what the guideposts are in this fuzzy land is probably the main source of concern for those who would like tighter controls on immigration to Canada.

Australia has chosen to establish these limits clearly. They are defined in terms of acceptance of the basic structures and principles of Australian society (the Constitution, the rule of law, parliamentary democracy, English as a national language, equality of the sexes, etc.), of the responsibility to accept the right of others to express their views and values, and of an overriding and unifying commitment to Australia, to its interests and future first and foremost.

While Canada is reluctant to develop any such “moral contract” defining the responsibilities of citizens, this is a matter that has been explicitly raised and discussed by the Quebec Government in the Gagnon-Tremblay report on immigration (December 1990). Quebec has stated clearly the basis of the Anoral contract it would wish the newcomers to accept: recognition of French as the language of public life, respect of liberal-democratic values, respect for pluralism, etc. This was not well received by the Canadian federal government, and Quebec has fought for these principles without much success. Of late, the creation of a separate Quebec citizenship has been proposed as a way to clarify these citizenship requirements. There is obviously some danger in trying to overformalize such contracts and covenants, but there is also much merit in providing a statement of some substantial principles on which to build these arrangements.

The danger of this unwillingness to establish clear conditions of admission and terms of integration is that it has allowed extreme forms of erosion of trust as significant groups have found it opportune to take advantage of the Canadian benefits without accepting any of the obligations that constitute the flip side of this Anoral contract of citizenship. This can only lead in the longer run to greater exclusion than would otherwise be desirable, and both old and new Canadians are consequently bound to be worse off.

(d) The last two hypotheses mentioned at the beginning of this section are less closely related to citizenship per se. They pertain to the ethos of the two countries – Canada and Australia – and underline the fact that, on two important fronts, the different perspectives of the two communities have resulted in the social learning process evolving differently.

First, the sort of social glue that is regarded as binding the citizenry together is quite different in Canada and in Australia. While Australia builds on commitment of the members bottom-up, to construct the identity and the commonalities, Canada has proved unable to follow this route and bets on inter regional and inter groups redistribution schemes as the foundation of citizenry. This is done on the basis of the assumption that egalitarian rights yield belonging (Vipond 1986). This has generated maybe unwittingly an instrumental view of citizenship – citizenship being viewed as a way to get access to the privileges of being a member. Some
observers (Banting 1999) pretend that Canada’s perspective is not strictly instrumental but this is a most unpersuasive argument; they also suggest that the only way to generate solidarity is by inter-regional and inter-groups laundering of money, but this is also questionable, even though it may understandably be regarded as a defendable stratagem to generate social cohesion if all else fails.

Secondly, Canada has developed a sociality of consensus that has made public debates and harshly critical appraisal of opposing views most unwelcome because they are likely to be both painful and divisive. This most un-Australian modus operandi has led to undue restraint in public debates, and greater timidity in tackling difficult policy issues (Caldwell 2001). This modest satisficing approach and the omnipresent search for appropriate compromises have had important positive impacts on the socio-economic performance of the country. Some, like Joseph Heath, even say that it is a particularly apt approach that has generated a very successful society (Heath 2001).

This oblique and timid approach to crucial policy issues has been strengthened considerably by the extraordinarily high degree of political correctness that has marred public debates in Canada. A few years ago, Judge John Sopinka, of the Supreme Court of Canada, has even suggested that political correctness in Canada had become the greatest enemy of free speech. It is most certainly a powerful enemy of vibrant debates on issues like citizenship.

This Canadian timidity has stalled the process of social learning by suppressing or stunting national debates. For instance, one is not allowed to discuss the required transformation of the costly and inefficient health care system in Canada – this is a taboo topic because medicare is purported to be the social glue that forges Canadian citizenship. One is only allowed to pay homage to the Canada Health Act as an untouchable icon despite its inadequacies (Paquet 2001d).

The fact that public debates are more robust and political correctness less crippling in Australia has accelerated social learning and made it possible to generate national debates on many fundamental aspects of Australian society – even the possibility of becoming a republic. In Canada, such debates have not been possible very often, and the painful experience with Meech and Charlottetown has made such initiatives even less likely in the future.

Finally, there has been much done explicitly in Australia (as in Switzerland) to root citizenship in sites at the local and state levels. This was part of a process that wished to ensure membership’s being felt bottom-up. Citizenship has been an active and emotional commitment built in consort with local authorities. In Canada, the federal government has hijacked the citizenship file. It has forcefully defined it as a status bestowed passively by the federal government as the monopoly agent entitled to do so. Citizenship has therefore degenerated into a federal gratification.

Moreover, to the extent that citizenship has come to be used as a federal instrument of Canadian unity, and used as an instrument of propaganda by the federal government to promote its view of the good life in the federation, this was bound to generate reactions on the part of fragments of the population that had a different point of view on what is the good life. And indeed, this is now happening. Quebec, being unable to find a place to locate its identity,
its participation or its sense of belonging within the federal discourse, is searching for a new site where it might be easier to do so. This has led to the recent proposal for the construction of a Quebec citizenship that would attempt to articulate separate rules of the game in Quebec. Australia, on the contrary, has used citizenship as an integrative feature involving state and local authorities, and has chosen to promote explicitly the involvement of local and state authorities in the liturgy of national celebration, especially at the time of public ceremonies to confer citizenship.

(2) Different emergent transversal ligatures

In both Australia and Canada, the notion of citizenship has not fully crystallized yet – it is still en emergence, but the nature of the moral contracts also appears to evolve quite distinctly in each case.

(a) Canadian citizenship is fundamentally anchored in the notion of legal status, and gives scant attention to participation. Australia, by contrast, emphasizes the participation dimension. Both countries pay attention to belonging but in a starkly different manner: in Australia, belonging as an emotional force to be emphasized as the foundation for commitment and participation; in Canada, belonging is looked upon with suspicion, for it is an echo of sub-national communities (national, ethnic, or other) that evokes emotional forces likely to undermine the integrity of the “national” political collectivity. Belonging is not abstract but visceral, and in Canada belonging is feared because it is seen as pertaining primarily to sub-Canadian communities. Yet outbursts of emotion on the occasion of Canada Day reveal the depth of this untapped “national” resource.

(b) Another important difference is in the relative importance given to the vertical and horizontal relationships (between state and citizen, and among citizens) in the definition of citizenship in Canada and Australia. In Canada, the emphasis is clearly on the vertical dimension, and citizenship is rooted fundamentally in the entitlements of the citizen from the state. The social glue integrating the groups is supposed to emerge from the inter-regional, inter-groups, and inter-personal redistribution of resources effected top-down by a centralized state. This has bolstered the instrumental notion of citizenship as a one-way contract to gain access to certain rights. In Australia, citizenship is more truly emphasizing the relationships among Australians, and the commitment to other members of the community by citizens themselves. There is some hostility to the instrumental notion of citizenship, and a strong emphasis on an emotional commitment, on the recognition of obligations, and on an agreement to actively participate as a condition of entry.

(c) Australia and Canada have explicitly recognized the constraint of diversity in some formal way. However, in the case of Canada, there has been a stronger reluctance to accept primary communities like Quebec (or Aboriginal groups) because of the very size of the Quebec fragment (and because of the multitude of smallish Aboriginal groups) for it might entail a significant balkanization of the country. In Australia, the existence of aboriginal communities has been acknowledged, and there has been a genuine attempt to reconcile unity and diversity through a composite citizenship.
Canada has been nervous about following the same strategy, so it has done so, in
general, in a rather timid way, but sometimes in a bold way locally as in the case onf
Nunavut (Paquet 1999b).

(d) The debate about the nature of the “civic” deficit has been robust in Australia since
1995. It is still inert in Canada. Instead of dealing forcefully and explicitly with this
need to square the circle—ensure national unity while fully legitimizing the diversity
of the civil society and fostering community participation—as was done in Australia,
the debate on citizenship has remained moot and less explicit in Canada.

(e) Despite the differences in approach, both countries are still grappling with some
important challenges that are likely to materialize in each country in the form of moral
contracts defining:

- the way in which one can recognize a multiplicity of citizenships and some order
  among these different allegiances
- the way in which citizenship can accommodate some priority among the multiplicity of
  allegiances to different ethno-cultural or sub-national communities within a nation-
  state
- the way in which to define in a congruent manner the degree of ease of entry and the
  power to deport—it being understood that the easier the entry is, the more powerful the
  instruments of expulsion might have to be
- the way in which communities can be provided with a democratic voice in the
  governance of the country either through some form of self-government or some sort of
  effective community representation
- the way of ensuring the requisite mix of status/participation/belonging in a world of
  multiple and limited identities through an explicit recognition that “ethnos” may well
  be forging the largest possible site of belonging (Lind 2000); the narrow interpretation
  of ethnicity as a static entity instead of a form of cultural practice has led to a very
  narrow definition of community and to a demonization of ethnicity; what is required is
  a capacity to recognize the social need for difference and a democracy of communities
  deriving from it, while not mandating that this should be the case for all communities,
  and therefore run the risk of balkanizing the country (Howard-Hassmann 1999).
- the way in which one might be able to use differentiated citizenship as a way to
  reconcile the multiplicity of allegiances and the different levels of commitments
- the focus on “recognition” and the redistribution of symbolic resources and the extent
  to which it can be a substitute for the sharing of real resources or the protection against
  real contingencies

(3) The paradoxes of the Canadian way

The Canadian ethos would appear to make it more difficult than in Australia to face squarely
the need to explicitly negotiate the terms of integration for citizens and newcomers, and to
determine what these terms might be in the new world of citizenship. Yet the task is clear:
what is needed is a nexus of moral contracts (1) that ensures the requisite degree of rights,
obligations, participation, appartenance and identity necessary for the country to prosper; (2)
that ensures that all the stakeholders retain their basic freedoms (political, economic, social) as a way to increase their capabilities; and (3) that the appropriate trade-offs are defined between these two sets of priorities.

The more timid and étapiste Canadian way is not necessarily an inferior strategy, since it fits the Canadian ethos. However, it entails a complex and somewhat erratic process of social learning, where progress comes most of the time by fits and starts, locally, by trial and error rather than as a result of broadly debated revolutionary transformation. This often means that social learning is fractured and slower. This fundamental Canadian conservatism could prove extremely costly in an evolutionary learning sense.

But this way of gauging the opportunity cost of the Canadian way may be somewhat unreasonable for it presumes that Canada has the choice of doing it otherwise. While theoretically such is the case, de facto, it is not. Compulsory debates imposed on a Canadian citizenry that has neither a taste for them nor a capacity to sustain them does not represent a meaningful alternative.

Canada can no more adopt the Australian way than the Swiss or the Japanese way in defining its moral contracts of citizenship. Even if Canada has to face many of the same challenges as these other countries (globalization, growing polyethnicty and multiculturalism, etc.), it is forced to confront these challenges with a different habitus (Bourdieu 1972). This habitus constitutes Canada’s idiosyncratic propensity to deal with issues in a particular way that has been inherited from its history and experience.

Canada’s habitus is its organized reaction capability, its manière de voir, a sum of its dispositions, and it has to be taken as a given at least in the intermediate run. Changing it amounts to changing Canada’s culture. The peculiar Canadian habitus is undoubtedly a source of slower learning and of a lesser ability to confront these challenges head on. But, Canada is condemned to deal with these challenges in ways that are congruent with its habitus.

This particular way is not without some advantages.

However frustrating and ineffective the Canadian way may appear by radical standards, it is not only efficient à la Heath but it may even constitute a truly attractive strategy for polyethnictic, multicultural, and plural societies in general when they do not have the capacity to orchestrate the sort of open and vibrant debates that Australia has seemingly managed to conduct in a legitimate and peaceful way. It may well be that Australia is rather unique, i.e., not representative of the social capabilities of most societies and that Canada with its crab-like, oblique mode of operations, is a more realistic approximation of what is observed generally – i.e., a fractured and somewhat disconcerted socio-economy incapable of anything but ad hocery. As a result, the slow, scattered, unfocused and small-stepped approach that Canada has known for might not be an unreasonable strategy for most countries.

De facto, Canada is slowly moving toward a supra-national and community-based federalism, while fruitless “official” debates continue unabated in a manner that appears very unpromising (Paquet 1999b). This de facto modest and oblique way to get there is obviously a roundabout way of tackling the unity-diversity problem, but, in many cases, it may be the only
practical way to proceed. Unwittingly, then, Canada may have invented an approach useable by many small nations to engineer the right strategy to preserve their cultural identity in a globalized world while allowing their component communities to maintain both their integrity and their capacity to be heard. This Canadian approach is characterized by a two-tracked strategy – a cacophonous public forum where the powers of disconcertion are modulated by a systematic avoidance of general, ambitious and all encompassing debates, while, in parallel, difficulties are resolved in situ most imaginatively even if it is in an ad hoc manner.

This social technology to square the unity-diversity circle is exportable, and citizens of most small and medium-sized countries may well come to the conclusion when they reflect on it that, in this sense, “ils sont tous Canadiens” (Paquet 2001d)

Conclusion

Australian and Canadian citizenships are emergent idiosyncratic realities. These complex institutions are the result of the on-going interaction between values and environment. The sort of social armistices and moral contracts embodying the workable notion of citizenship at any moment, and the sort of adaptive learning process defining the dynamics of the terms of integration over time are different from one society to another.

First, this paper has suggested that the syncretic notion of citizenship may be usefully analyzed through a prism that reveals its complexity, its fundamental transversality, and its essentially emergent nature. A two-stage process has been sketched to identify the basic dimensions of interest, and to suggest the mix of ligatures that would appear to be useful to compare different types of citizenship.

Second, these templates have been used to contrast the Australian and the Canadian way of evolving their notion of citizenship. In the Australian case, the nexus of moral contracts defining citizenship would appear to have been arrived at through more vibrant national debates and to have elicited a more explicit and proactive set of moral contracts.

In Canada, a more ad hoc and pragmatic process avoiding national debates has generated a more tacit and passive set of vague arrangements.

While the former experience appears to be more satisfying from an intellectual point of view, it depends much on the existence of a national ethos and habitus that carry the capacity to underpin such national debates. Canada’s ethos would appear to be unable to promote and support such robust debates without generating much divisiveness.

It is not unreasonable to suggest however that Canada may be more typical of most pluralist societies, and that, in such societies, the low road of ad hocery appears to be the only way to avoid divisive, destructive and perilous national debates.

The paper is therefore led to conclude that the slow and erratic road to citizenship adopted by Canada might be a useable model in our post-modern world. While one might deplore Canadians’ incapacity to conduct a high road debate on such issues, and bemoan the ad hocery
of citizenship construction in Canada, the extraordinary excesses and violence that would appear to ensue, when such broad national debates are engineered or simply experienced in contexts that are not suited to them, would appear to favor the more modest Canadian way.

This conclusion should not be interpreted however as condoning the centralized mindset that underpins the current federal “liberal constitutional project” (Carter 1998) in vogue in Canada nor its top down, heavy handed, arrogant efforts to devoice communities, and to use citizenship as a way to smother deep diversity.

Canada may be right in general but wrong in particulars on this front. Hopefully, we have made the case for it being right in general. As to the ways in which one might be able to use the citizenship debates to correct some of the most destructive particulars, this is a topic for another paper.

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